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More and more individuals are turning toward encrypted methods of Internet communication in or-
der to keep their online activities private. As a result of this trend, the government is facing serious diffi-
culties in combating crimes such as online child trafficking on the dark web due to its highly encrypted 
design. While it is my conclusion in this paper that under the third party doctrine, an individual has no 
heightened expectation of privacy when using the dark web, it is my belief that the third party doctrine 
must be revisited in order to reflect evolving expectations of privacy, conflicts of law, and the realities of 
modern day Internet usage. It is my goal in this paper to analyze the issue through the increasingly com-
plex and rapidly evolving labyrinth of domestic and international privacy law. 
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In 2013, the dark web gained particular notoriety when the media reported the FBI’s takedown of 
Ross Ulbricht, the kingpin behind the infamous Silk Road black marketplace.1  Ulbricht’s capture sent 
a chill across the online community, leaving many questioning how law enforcement was able to track 
Ulbricht’s identity on the highly encrypted dark web.  Most importantly, Ulbricht’s capture served as a 
reminder that there is no reasonable expectation of privacy online, regardless of how deep one may 
go on the Internet. 
The dark web has been both lauded for its accomplishments in facilitating democratic ideals, and 
criticized for enabling criminals to conduct illegal activity beyond the reach of the law.  Following the 
Snowden leaks2 in 2013, many have turned to the dark web to encrypt online identity and defend pri-
vacy for both legal and illegal means.  With the public advocating for encryption and more robust pri-
vacy laws, law enforcement is now facing a serious threat in combating crime.3 
The purpose of this paper is to analyze the concept of privacy on the dark web, and evaluate 
whether dark web users have an expectation of privacy in their encrypted activity in light of law en-
forcement’s interest in tracking and identifying criminals involved in cross-border crime.  It is my po-
sition that an individual who voluntarily shares information on the Internet, whether on the dark or 
surface web, can only assert a limited expectation of privacy, if at all, in such activity.  Dark web users 
conduct their activity in a public forum.  Therefore, strong encryption does little to establish a reason-
able expectation of privacy on balance with law enforcement’s strong interest in combating crime. 
First, this paper will introduce various international approaches to privacy as a human right.  Sec-
ond, it will provide an overview of the differing layers of the Internet.  Third, it will examine the U.S. 
legal framework surrounding online privacy in both the domestic and international arenas, and intro-
duce the methods the U.S. government has adopted to unveil the identity of dark web users.  Fourth, it 
will determine whether individuals have an expectation of privacy in activity on the dark web.  Finally, 
it will analyze the jurisdictional obstacles facing law enforcement’s ability to execute criminal investi-
gations while respecting different approaches to data privacy in a globalized world. 
II. PRIVACY AS A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT 
 
1. Vincenzo Ciancaglini et al., Below the Surface: Exploring the Deep Web, TREND MICRO (2015), 
http://www.trendmicro.com/cloud-content/us/pdfs/security-intelligence/white-papers/wp_be-
low_the_surface.pdf (last visited Dec. 8, 2016). 
2.  In 2013, Edward Snowden, a former contractor for the CIA, leaked to the media, details of mass Internet and 
phone surveillance by the U.S. National Security Agency (NSA). The controversial program, code named 
PRISM, began in 2007 and involved participation by several technology companies such as Yahoo!, Google, 
and Microsoft. 
3. Natasha Bertrand, ISIS is Taking Full Advantage of the Darkest Corners of the Internet, BUSINESS INSIDER (Jul. 11, 
2015, 11:26 AM), available at http://www.businessinsider.com/isis-is-using-the-dark-web-2015-7. 
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The concept of privacy is rooted in some of the world’s oldest texts and cultures.4  Its definition, 
however, can vary dramatically from culture to culture.5  Societies made up of large communities living 
in close contact with one another often assume a lower expectation of privacy, whereas more sepa-
rated, individualized cultures assume a higher expectation of privacy that values autonomy and space.6  
World bodies, organizations, and individuals have grappled with the concept and definition of privacy, 
associating it with an individual’s ability to choose the manner and circumstances under which one 
may expose his feelings and behavior to others, to the essence of human personality.7  Such ideals are 
meant to guard individuality, autonomy, dignity, emotional release, self-evaluation, and interpersonal 
relationships.8  
In several parts of the world, privacy has developed within the context of human rights.9  In 1948, 
the General Assembly of the United Nations adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.10  Ar-
ticle 12 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights explicitly announced: “No one shall be subjected 
to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to attacks upon his 
honor and reputation. Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or 
attacks.”11  Similarly set forth in 1948, the Organization of American States adopted the American Dec-
laration of the Rights and Duties of Man, providing that, “[e]very person has the right to the protection 
of the law against abusive attacks upon . . . his private and family life.”12  In 1950, the Council of Europe 
introduced the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 
which sought to formalize the goals of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights by rule of law.13  The 
Convention states that, “[e]veryone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and 
his correspondence.”14 
 
4. PETER SWIRE & KENESA AHMAD, FOUNDATIONS OF INFORMATION PRIVACY AND DATA PRIVACY: A SURVEY OF GLOBAL 
CONCEPTS, LAWS AND PRACTICES 1, 2 (2012) [hereinafter SWIRE & AHMAD, FOUNDATIONS] (“Privacy is referenced 
numerous times in the laws of classical Greece and in the Bible. The concept of the freedom from being 
watched has historically been recognized by Jewish law. Privacy is similarly recognized in the Qur’an and in 
the sayings of Mohammed where there is discussion of the privacy of prayer as well as in the avoidance of 
spying or taking ill of something behind their back.”). 
5. Jeremy Fogel, From the Bench: A Reasonable Expectation of Privacy, THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION LITIGATION 
JOURNAL (Spring 2014), http://www.americanbar.org/publications/litigation_journal/2013-
14/spring/a_reasonable_expectation_privacy.html (last visited Dec. 8, 2016). (Legal recognition of privacy 
has existed in England since 1361). 
6. Id. 
7. SWIRE & AHMAD, FOUNDATIONS, supra note 4, at 1. 
8. Id. 
9. Id. at 3. 
10. Id. 
11. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948). 
12. SWIRE & AHMAD, FOUNDATIONS, supra note 4, at 3. 
13. Id. 
14. Id. 
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In the United States, privacy has focused on the right to privacy of one’s person.15  Unlike the E.U., 
the U.S. Constitution does not provide a “right” to privacy, whereas European legal texts define privacy 
as a human right.16  Furthermore, the U.S. has no single, overarching privacy law.17  Instead, it follows 
a sectoral approach that imposes federal regulations on specific industries, such as healthcare and 
consumer credit reporting, while leaving others unprotected.18  Beyond these limited federal privacy 
restrictions, Congress has left stricter privacy legislation to the states.19 
In contrast with the U.S., the European Union employs a comprehensive model to privacy regula-
tion, setting forth an overarching legal structure to protect the fundamental rights and freedoms of 
E.U. citizens.20  Data privacy laws in the E.U. are far stricter than those in the U.S., producing both ben-
efits and drawbacks.  For example, in March 2015, Germany suffered the blowback of a strict privacy 
regime when Germanwings co-pilot Andreas Lubitz crashed a commercial airplane into the French 
Alps, killing everyone on board.21  Germany’s vigorous approach to privacy protection enabled Lubitz 
to hide a serious mental illness from his employer and commit mass murder.22  This event, among 
other recent attacks, has raised concerns that European privacy laws are too strict and has ignited a 
debate regarding whether European privacy laws are too robust on balance with protecting public 
safety.23 
In Australia, which uses a co-regulatory model, individuals do not have absolute rights under Aus-
tralian law, but rather the focus is on “reasonableness” to reflect adequate privacy protection while 
also facilitating business.24  At the other end of the spectrum, the People’s Republic of China does not 
have a comprehensive privacy law.25 
III. THE DIVIDED INTERNET 
 
15. Fogel, supra note 5 (“When he famously described “the right to be let alone” as “the most comprehensive of 
rights and the right most valued by civilized men,” . . . Justice Brandeis was channeling a sentiment that is 
embedded deeply in both our common law and our society.”). 
16. SWIRE & AHMAD, FOUNDATIONS, supra note 4, at 41. 
17. Daniel Dimov, Differences Between the Privacy Laws in the EU and the US, INFOSEC INSTITUTE (Jan. 10, 2013), 
http://resources.infosecinstitute.com/differences-privacy-laws-in-eu-and-us/.  
18. Id.   
19. Id.   
20. SWIRE & AHMAD, FOUNDATIONS, supra note 4, at 34. 
21. Simon Shuster, German Privacy Laws Let Pilot ‘Hide’ His Illness From Employers, TIME (Mar. 27, 2015), available 
at http://time.com/3761895/germanwings-privacy-law/. 
22. Id.   
23. See id. (“[A]s a rule, when the German legal system is compared to those in the U.S. and other European states, 
Germany gives more weight to personal privacy than to public safety . . . [e]mployers are even restricted in 
checking the criminal records of the people they are seeking to hire, as under German law, the employer must 
usually rely on the applicants themselves to provide such information voluntarily.”). 
24. SWIRE & AHMAD, FOUNDATIONS, supra note 4, at 45. See also ALBERT J, MARCELLA JR. & CAROL STUCKI, PRIVACY 
HANDBOOK: GUIDELINES, EXPOSURES, POLICY IMPLEMENTATION, AND INTERNATIONAL ISSUES 72 (2003) (under the co-
regulatory approach, “industry develops rules for the protection of privacy, which are enforced by the indus-
try and overseen by the privacy agency.”). 
25. SWIRE & AHMAD, FOUNDATIONS, supra note 4, at 45. 
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The Internet is a network that links websites through the World Wide Web (Web).26  The Web is 
divided into different components.27   
The surface web, which most are familiar with, enables users to access indexed pages through a 
web browser.  Through typing words into a browser’s search box, the browser, “sends ‘spiders’ to in-
dex[ed] hyperlinks to static web pages,” thereby returning the desired results.28  While this method of 
searching is most convenient for the majority of Internet users, “[i]t is estimated that even the best 
search engines can access only 16 percent of information available on the web.”29  
In contrast to the surface web, the deep web refers to the portion of the Internet that cannot be, or 
is not indexed through traditional search engines.30  Most of the content on the Internet is located on 
the deep web, outside the reach of traditional web browsers.31  Because material on the deep web is 
not indexed, one must have the precise URL to access the desired page.  Although the deep web may 
be difficult to navigate, roughly 95 percent of it consists of publicly accessible information.32 
Within the deep web exists a hidden space called the dark web, which is inaccessible through stand-
ard web browsing methods.33  This hidden space is popularly known as a platform for hosting illicit 
activity, ranging from terrorist recruitment to drug trading, child pornography, stolen information, 
and money laundering services.34  These hidden domains trade in cryptocurrency, or “bitcoins,” an 
unregulated online currency, to maximize anonymity.35  Most dark web sites use the special anonym-
ity software TOR (The Onion Router), which encrypts user identity by bundling incoming data into 
encrypted packets, anonymizing information about the sender by stripping away part of its packet 
header, encrypting the remainder of the address information, and sending the encrypted data packet 
through several servers, called relays, en route to its final destination.36  In effect, this prevents others 
from identifying the user’s origin with its destination.37   
TOR was developed from funding by the Naval Research Laboratory in the 1990s as a tool for evad-
ing online detection.38  It receives roughly 60 percent of its funding through the State Department and 
 
26. Abdulmajeed Alhogbani, Going Dark: Scratching the Surface of Government Surveillance, 23 COMMLAW 
CONSPECTUS 469, 480 (2015). 
27. Id.  
28. Id. 
29. Id. at 480. 
30. Ciancaglini et al., supra note 1, at 5. 
31. Alhogbani, supra note 26, at 481. 
32. Id. at 482. 
33. Id. 
34. Id. 
35. Id. 
36. Jill Scharr, What is Tor? Answers to Frequently Asked Questions, TOM’S GUIDE (Oct. 23, 2013, 7:00 AM), 
http://www.tomsguide.com/us/what-is-tor-faq,news-17754.html. 
37. Andy Greenberg, Hacker Lexicon: What is the Dark Web?, WIRED (Nov. 19, 2014),  
http://www.wired.com/2014/11/hacker-lexicon-whats-dark-web/. 
38. David Perera, Foundation of ‘dark Web’ steps into the light, POLITICO (Oct. 21, 2015, 4:52 PM), http://www.po-
litico.com/story/2015/10/foundation-of-dark-web-steps-into-the-light-215027. 
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the Department of Defense, both of whom share an interest in developing a secure network for gov-
ernment agencies and promoting an open Internet.39   
IV. COMBATING INTERNATIONAL CRIME ON THE DARK WEB  
International crime rings span across several jurisdictions, all of which offer different degrees of 
privacy protection. Within the U.S., the Fourth Amendment governs searches and seizures and pro-
tects U.S persons from unreasonable government intrusion.  Beyond the U.S., law enforcement is held 
to a more flexible standard, and any international law forbidding sovereigns from infringing on an-
other’s data privacy laws may prove ineffective from an enforcement standpoint.40  
A. U.S. Legal Framework  
1. The Fourth Amendment 
The Fourth Amendment safeguards against the unreasonable search and seizure, by any govern-
ment actor, of one’s person or one’s property by requiring that a warrant based upon probable cause 
be issued by a neutral magistrate.  “A ‘search’ occurs ‘when an expectation of privacy that society . . . 
consider[s] reasonable is infringed.’”41  A property-based approach to the Fourth Amendment makes 
clear that certain areas, such as an individual’s home, are awarded the utmost privacy protection.42  
Warrantless intrusion into one’s home is fiercely guarded under the Fourth Amendment, while other 
areas are left less protected.43  Technology has further complicated the concept of privacy under the 
Fourth Amendment given the inability of the law to keep up with and protect evolving societal expec-
tations of privacy.  For many, smartphones and laptops now store some of the most intimate details of 
our lives.44 
 
39. David Kushner, The Darknet: Is the Government Destroying ‘the Wild West of the Internet’, ROLLING STONE (Oct. 
22, 2015), available at http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/the-battle-for-the-dark-net-20151022. 
40. See ELENA KATSELLI PROUKAKI, THE PROBLEM OF ENFORCEMENT IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: COUNTERMEASURES, THE NON-
INJURED STATE AND THE IDEA OF INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY (2011), available at 
https://books.google.com/books?id=1rSNA-
gAAQBAJ&pg=PT461&lpg=PT461&dq=international+law+meaningless&source=bl&ots=sKN0I8c0UA&sig=
3vdEUyDrxU6ch2I4nDOR-
BEtgxk0&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0CDQQ6AEwBGoVChMIxsK8_6vayAIVU81jCh0h1AvW#v=onepage&q=meanin
gless&f=false  (“Due to the decentralized character of the international legal order and in the absence of insti-
tutions empowered to enforce international law generally, implementation, through the application of coun-
termeasures, is entrusted to each state individually which is called, by its own means, to protect its rights.”). 
41. United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 712 (1984). 
42. Kyllo v. U.S., 533 U.S. 27, 31 (2001). 
43. See Oliver v. U.S., 466 U.S. 170, 176 (1984) (government intrusion into “open fields” not unreasonable under 
the Fourth Amendment). 
44. See Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2490 (2014) (“Today . . . it is no exaggeration to say that many of the 
more than 90% of American adults who own a cell phone keep on their person a digital record of nearly every 
aspect of their lives—from the mundane to the intimate.”). 
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In 1967, the Supreme Court extended the Fourth Amendment to protect intangible interests, such 
as privacy, for the first time.45  In Katz v. United States, the Court declared that, “[t]he Fourth Amend-
ment protects people, not places,”46 when it held that the unwarranted wiretapping of a citizen’s con-
versation in a public phone booth was an unconstitutional search and seizure under the Fourth 
Amendment.47  Katz, however, limited Fourth Amendment protection to activity in which an individual 
can establish a subjective expectation of privacy that is objectively reasonable.48  While Katz extended 
Fourth Amendment protection to that which an individual takes measures to keep private, it expressly 
excluded from protection activities one “knowingly exposes to the public.”49  These “objects, activities, 
or statements . . . [one] exposes to the ‘plain view’ of outsiders are not ‘protected’ because no intention 
to keep them to [one’s self] has been exhibited.”50  
Though Katz expanded protection to certain privacy matters outside the home, it left several ques-
tions unanswered, such as how, if at all, the analysis may change depending on the purpose of the 
invasion (i.e., foreign intelligence, national security, criminal investigations), the legal status of those 
subject to the interception (i.e., U.S. versus non-U.S. persons), or the location of the search or seizure 
(i.e., whether the interception took place strictly within the U.S., between the U.S. and a foreign terri-
tory, or exclusively abroad).51 
2. The Third Party Doctrine 
In the aftermath of Katz, the Court developed the third party doctrine, which states, “that a person 
has no legitimate expectation of privacy in information he voluntarily turns over to third parties.”52  
The Supreme Court has generally held that where an individual makes information available to a third 
party, the government may obtain the information without a warrant, regardless of whether the act 
includes subjectively reasonable private behavior.53  In essence, unless an activity is kept entirely 
within the access and control of one individual, it is regarded as having been exposed to the public 
under the law.  The third party doctrine has long been a source of significant debate among privacy 
advocates given its breadth and outdated reasoning.  The Supreme Court has not directly clarified how, 
 
45. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
46. Id. at 351. 
47. Id. at 358. 
48. Id. at 351-352 (“what [an individual] seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, 
may be constitutionally protected.”). 
49. Id. at 351 (“[w]hat a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not subject to 
Fourth Amendment protection.”). 
50. Id. at 361. 
51. Laura Donohue, Section 702 and the Collection of International Telephone and Internet Content, 38 HARV. J.L. & 
PUB. POL’Y 117, 206 (2015). 
52. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743-44 (1979) (no expectation of privacy in phone numbers dialed). See also 
United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442 (1976) (no expectation of privacy in information voluntarily con-
veyed to banks). 
53. Marley Degner, Riley and the Third Party Doctrine, PILLSBURY WINTHROP SHAW PITTMAN LLP (Apr. 9, 2015), 
http://www.pillsburylaw.com/siteFiles/Publica-
tions/AR_Riley_and_the_thirdparty_doctrine_Degner_4915.pdf. 
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and to what extent, the third party doctrine applies to the Internet, and lower courts are in disagree-
ment.54 
In an attempt to limit the scope of the doctrine, Congress passed in 1986, the Electronic Communi-
cations Privacy Act (ECPA), and its counterpart, the Stored Communications Act (SCA).  With both 
pieces of legislation, Congress intended to establish clearer standards surrounding Fourth Amend-
ment searches in light of evolving technology.  It is important to note that ECPA was written before the 
Internet became widely used by the public—well before many moved their personal identities online, 
and well before cloud computing.55  While Congress failed to draft these statutes to allow for adequate 
privacy protection on evolving technology, both statutes have at least served to limit the expansive-
ness of the third party doctrine to some effect. 
Currently, the third party doctrine applies equally to both surface web and dark web activity. 
3. The Fourth Amendment Beyond U.S. Borders 
The text of the Fourth Amendment extends only to “the people.”56  Construed in light of the Consti-
tution as a whole, “‘the people’ . . . refers to a class of persons who are part of a national community or 
who have otherwise developed sufficient connection with this country to be considered part of that 
community.”57   
In United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, the Court examined whether the Fourth Amendment applies 
to the search and seizure by U.S. agents of property located in a foreign country owned by a non-resi-
dent alien.58  There, the Court held that a non-resident alien with no voluntary attachment to the U.S., 
whose property subject to the search was located outside the United States, did not have protection 
under the Fourth Amendment because he lacked “substantial connection” with the United States.59 
The Court found that, “the purpose of the Fourth Amendment was to protect the people of the United 
States against arbitrary action by their own Government” rather than, “to restrain the actions of the 
Federal Government against aliens outside the United States territory.”60  
 
54. Id. See, e.g., United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 286 (2010) (“the mere ability of a third-party intermedi-
ary to access the contents of a communication cannot be sufficient to extinguish a reasonable expectation of 
privacy”). 
55. Under My Thumb: Governments Grapple With Law Enforcement in the Virtual World, THE ECONOMIST (Oct. 10, 
2015), available at http://www.economist.com/news/international/21672204-governments-grapple-law-
enforcement-virtual-world-under-my-thumb?frsc=dg%7Cc [hereinafter Under My Thumb]. 
56. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 265 (1990). 
57. Id. 
58. Id. at 262. 
59. Id. at 271-275 (“For better or for worse, we live in a world of nation-states in which our Government must be 
able to ‘functio[n] effectively in the company of sovereign nations.’ [citation]. Some who violate our laws may 
live outside our borders under a regime quite different from that which obtains in this country. Situations 
threatening to important American interests may arise half-way around the globe, situations which in the 
view of the political branches of our Government require an American response with armed force. If there are 
to be restrictions on searches and seizures which occur incident to such American action, they must be im-
posed by the political branches through diplomatic understanding, treaty, or legislation.”). 
60. Id. at 266. 
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Several questions remain unanswered in the aftermath of Verdugo-Urquidez with respect to the 
meaning of “lawful presence” in the U.S. in the digital age, where information by both U.S. citizens and 
foreigners are stored in servers around the world.61  Of particular importance are the following issues: 
whether online contacts with the United States, such as storing files on U.S.-based servers, become 
relevant for Fourth Amendment protection; whether the Fourth Amendment limits evidence obtained 
when law enforcement mistakenly believes an individual lacks Fourth Amendment rights, or their sta-
tus is unknown; and finally, how the Fourth Amendment affects communications between individuals 
protected by the Fourth Amendment, and those lacking such rights.62 
With regard to U.S. citizens searched extraterritorially, three circuit courts have considered the 
question of Fourth Amendment application beyond U.S. borders.63  The Ninth Circuit approach to 
Fourth Amendment reasonableness requires the U.S. government to cooperate with foreign authori-
ties to comply with foreign law in the jurisdiction of the search when conducting a search or seizure 
abroad.64  The Second and Seventh Circuits have held that Fourth Amendment reasonableness pursu-
ant to an extraterritorial search, where the U.S. is acting alone or through a joint investigation with a 
foreign sovereign, does not require a warrant but rather an evaluation of the government need on 
balance with the privacy interest at stake.65  
4. National Security Exceptions 
Under Katz, the Fourth Amendment protects U.S. citizens from warrantless eavesdropping by the 
government,66 unless the need falls within an exception to the warrant requirement, such as national 
security. 
The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) has defined the contours of the warrant clause of 
the Fourth Amendment regarding electronic interceptions on U.S. soil.67  “FISA is the primary vehicle 
allowing the government to conduct covert surveillance of those suspected of terrorist activities in the 
United States,” and allows “for electronic surveillance of communications between or among foreign 
powers,” without a court order, in some circumstances.68  Where a court order is required, the Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC), a special court for FISA applications, may approve FISA appli-
cations “notwithstanding any other law.”69  Not only does FISC approve a wide majority of FISA appli-
cations, the process remains classified, and therefore largely unchecked due to the sensitive nature of 
national security.70   
 
61. See Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and the Global Internet, 67 STAN. L. REV. 285, 302. 
62. Id. at 303. 
63. Id. at 297. 
64. Id. 
65. Id. 
66. Katz, 389 U.S. at 354. 
67. Donohue, supra note 51.  
68. Rebecca Copeland, War On Terrorism or War on Constitutional Rights? Blurring the Lines of Intelligence Gath-
ering in Post-September 11 America, 35 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1, 2-3 (2004). 
69. Id.at 3. 
70. See id. at 15. 
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Section 702 of FISA allows for broad monitoring of Internet activity by non-U.S. persons believed 
to be located outside the United States.71  However, purely domestic communications are often routed 
through extraterritorial servers without an individual’s knowledge, subjecting them to collection pur-
suant to FISA.  Given that data may cross borders several times in a single communication, Section 702 
provides law enforcement with an avenue to collect information on U.S. citizens within the contours 
of the law.  Beyond Section 702, several courts, including the FISC, have relied on the third party doc-
trine to uphold data surveillance of U.S. citizens in the name of national security.72 
5. Current Methods for Catching Criminals on the Dark Web 
With the rising popularity of encryption, law enforcement is increasingly facing difficulties in con-
ducting criminal investigations. Consumers are demanding more privacy, and are turning to technol-
ogy that offers more security and anonymity.  While privacy rights continue to evolve as technology 
advances, it is critical to note that the Fourth Amendment merely requires that searches and seizures 
be reasonable. 
a. Memex 
While special browsers such as TOR provide strong anonymity protection to dark web users, law 
enforcement has been fighting back within the ambits of the law.73  The U.S. Defense Advanced Re-
search Projects Agency (DARPA) has developed a search engine called Memex to help the Department 
of Defense fight human trafficking and potentially help uncover other illegal activity on the dark web.74  
In essence, Memex is scraping and indexing millions of web pages that cannot be accessed through 
traditional search engines, including thousands of sites featured on dark web browsers such as TOR.75  
While Memex does not unmask the IP addresses or identities of dark web users, it analyzes content to 
uncover patterns and relationships, which law enforcement has been able to track and trace back to 
the user.76  Although much of the content Memex is designed to index is not accessible through a com-
mercial search engine, the information is nevertheless still considered “public”.77  DARPA contends 
 
71. See 50 U.S.C. § 1881a (2015).  
72. RICHARD THOMPSON II, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43586, THE FOURTH AMENDMENT THIRD-PARTY DOCTRINE 1, 3 
(2014). 
73. See Charlie Osborn, UK Gov’t Tackles Dark Web With New Cybercrime Unit, ZDNET (Nov. 9, 2015, 2:19 PST), 
http://www.zdnet.com/article/uk-govt-tackles-dark-web-with-new-cybercrime-unit/ (the U.K. has simi-
larly begun to wage a war, and has designated an entire unit to fighting cybercrime on the dark web).   
74. Anthony Cuthbertson, Death of the Dark Web? DARPA’s Memex Search Engine Allows Tor Tracking, 
INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TIMES (Feb. 16, 2015, 1:38 GMT), available at http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/death-dark-
web-darpas-memex-search-engine-allows-tor-tracking-1488124. 
75. Id. 
76. Id. 
77. Kim Zetter, DARPA is Developing A Search Engine for the Dark Web, WIRED (Feb. 10, 2015, 10:17 AM), 
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that its objective with Memex is not to de-anonymize the dark web, but rather to fight human traffick-
ing.78  
b. Network Investigative Techniques 
In a 2012 investigation titled “Operation Torpedo,” the FBI utilized a method called NIT, or a “net-
work investigative technique,” to unveil the IP addresses of at least twenty-five individuals who visited 
child pornography websites on the dark web.79  Beginning with an investigation in the Netherlands, 
authorities from the Netherlands’ national police force were able to write a web crawler that searched 
the dark web for TOR websites.80  The authorities were able to narrow the websites to those related 
to child pornography, and eventually unveil the real IP address of one site called “Pedoboard,” in Belle-
vue, Nebraska.81  Upon being delivered the information, the FBI was able to track the address to Aaron 
McGrath, who was hosting three child porn sites.82  After one year of surveillance, the FBI seized 
McGrath’s servers and searched each server pursuant to a valid warrant.83  As authorized by the war-
rant, the FBI modified the code on the servers to deliver the NIT to computers that accessed the illegal 
sites, allowing for delayed notification to the targets for thirty days.84  Within two weeks, the FBI was 
able to collect the IP addresses of visitors to the sites and subpoena the ISPs for the home addresses 
and subscriber names of each subject.85  
Recent litigation stemming from a similar dark web investigation has called the technique into 
question.86  In a 2015 investigation involving a child pornography website named “Playpen,” defend-
ants have been challenging the government’s use of the technique by arguing that the magistrate judge, 
located in the Eastern District of Virginia, had no authority under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 
41(b)(1)87 to issue the warrant authorizing a search beyond the Eastern District of Virginia.88  Alt-
hough courts have generally agreed that the magistrate judge lacked authority to issue the warrant 
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85. Poulsen, supra note 79. 
86. See United States v. Levin, No. 15-10271-WGY, 2016 WL 2596010 (D. Mass. May 5, 2016); United States v. 
Epich, No. 15-CR-163-PP, 2016 WL 953269 (E.D. Wis. Mar. 14, 2016); United States v. Michaud, No. 3:15-cr-
05351-RJB, 2016 WL 337263 (W.D. Wash. Jan 28, 2016). 
87.  Rule 41(b)(1) grants a magistrate judge the authority to issue a warrant to search for and seize a person or 
property located within their district. As of December 1, 2016, Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41 has 
been amended to grant magistrate judges the authority to issue a warrant beyond their district where the 
suspect has either used technological means to mask the location of his or her computer, or where the crime 
involves the hacking of computers located across five or more different judicial districts. 
88. United States v. Gabriel Werdene, No. 15-434, 2016 WL 3002376 (E.D. Pa. May 18, 2016). 
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under Rule 41, they have disagreed as to whether suppression is the appropriate remedy.89  Notwith-
standing a Rule 41 challenge, several courts have recently found that an individual has no reasonable 
expectation of privacy in his or her IP address,90 thereby eradicating the need for a warrant given that 
the technique does not involve a search under the Fourth Amendment.91 
c. Traditional Techniques 
Despite Constitutional limitations, law enforcement is free to conduct investigations the old-fash-
ioned way—traditional tactics such as infiltrating criminal rings through undercover operations and 
tracking individuals in public places remain fair game. 
In November 2014, law enforcement agents successfully coordinated Operation Onymous, leading 
to the seizure of dozens of TOR hidden services.92  While it remains unknown how law enforcement 
captured the sites, security researchers speculate that government hackers may have used “denial of 
service” attacks, which “flood Tor relays with junk data to force target sites to use Tor relays they con-
trolled, thus tracing their IP addresses.”93  It is likewise entirely possible that law enforcement used 
traditional means, such as informants or undercover operations, to effectuate the takedown. 
In the case of the Silk Road, law enforcement claims that Ross Ulbricht’s own mistakes led to his 
capture, and that no illegal acts or sophisticated methods of intrusion were necessary to take down 
the drug kingpin.94  Former FBI agent Christopher Tarbell contends that he and another agent merely 
found a misconfiguration on the Silk Road’s login page, which divulged the server’s IP address, and its 
physical location.95  Police in Reykjavik, Iceland, where the server was located, then “accessed and se-
cretly copied the server’s data.”96  Ulbricht maintains that law enforcement illegally hacked the server 
 
89. Compare Michaud, 2016 WL 337263, at 6-7 (finding there was a violation of Rule 41(b) but that suppression 
is inappropriate because the government acted in good faith and the defendant was not prejudiced), Werdene, 
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90. See United States v. Farrell, 2016 WL 705197, at 1 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 23, 2016); United States v. Matish, 2016 
WL 3545776 (E.D. Va. Jul. 28, 2017), at 20-21; Werdene, 2016 WL 3002376; Michaud, 2016 WL 337263, at 7. 
91. Matish, 2016 WL 3545776, at 23. 
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the garbled-letter image designed to prevent spam bots from entering the site. . . . ‘This indicated that the 
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in violation of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA)97, and that all evidence obtained following 
the alleged illegal search should be suppressed as fruit of the poisonous tree.98  Prosecutors were care-
ful not to concede, and countered that any hypothetical “hacking” of the Silk Road server would nev-
ertheless be legal because the foreign location of the server, in conjunction with the Silk Road’s repu-
tation as a criminal marketplace, means that Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable 
searches does not apply.99  Moreover, the CFAA, which prohibits unlawful “hacking,” contains an ex-
press exception for lawfully authorized law enforcement activity, provided it is reasonable.100   
V. THE EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY ON THE DARK WEB 
Changing expectations of privacy online, and the complexity of Fourth Amendment application to 
international crime on the Internet can make it unclear whether dark web users have any legitimate 
expectation of privacy in using encryption technology, or whether the analysis is identical to Internet 
use on the surface web, where third party doctrine and national security exceptions govern. 
A. Katz Reasonable Expectation of Privacy Test 
Under Katz, we must first determine whether dark web users have a subjective expectation that 
their activity will be kept private.  Individuals use services such as TOR for the specific purpose of 
keeping their online identity and activity a secret, as TOR’s design encrypts activity several times over.  
Based on TOR’s design, it is clear that dark web users subjectively believe their activity will remain 
anonymous, as that is the purpose of the dark web. 
With a clear subjective expectation of privacy, we must next determine whether that expectation 
is objectively reasonable.101  The third party doctrine, in its current form, makes very clear that it is 
objectively unreasonable for individuals to purport a reasonable expectation of privacy regarding 
online activity, regardless of whether that activity occurs on the surface web, or on an encrypted 
 
97.  Enacted by Congress in 1986, CFAA aims to reduce the instances of computer offenses by criminalizing indi-
viduals who intentionally access a computer without authorization. 
98. United States v. Ulbricht, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 145553, *7 (2014). See also Gov’t Resp. to the Decl. of Josh 
Horowitz 7, https://archive.org/stream/pdfy-bxSbsz636MwNIwsr/242138723-Prosecution-Response-to-
Horowitz-Declaration_djvu.txt (last visited Dec. 10, 2016).  See also U.S. v. Figueredo-Diaz, 718 F.3d 568, 574 
(2013) (”fruit of the poisonous tree,” a doctrine developed by the federal and state courts, operates to exclude 
from trial both primary evidence obtained as a direct result of an illegal search or seizure, as well as evidence 
later discovered and found to be derivative of an illegality). 
99. Gov’t Resp. to the Decl. of Josh Horowitz, supra note 98, at 7. See also Andy Greenberg, Feds ‘Hacked’ Silk Road 
Without a Warrant? Perfectly Legal, Prosecutors Argue, WIRED (Oct. 7, 2014, 9:41 AM), 
http://www.wired.com/2014/10/feds-silk-road-hack-legal/ (“Given that the SR Server was hosting a bla-
tantly criminal website, it would have been reasonable for the FBI to ‘hack’ into it in order to search it, as any 
such ‘hack’ would simply have constituted a search of foreign property known to contain criminal evidence, 
for which a warrant was not necessary”). 
100. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(f). 
101. See United States v. Jacobson, 466 U.S. 109, 122 (1984) (“The concept of an interest in privacy that society is 
prepared to recognize as reasonable is, by its very nature, critically different than from the mere expectation, 
however well justified, that certain facts will not come to the attention of the authorities.”). 
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browser such as TOR.102  Taken together with an all-encompassing national security exception, any 
privacy expectation online is essentially nonexistent, especially where the Internet is being used to 
further criminal activity.  
B. The Constitutionality of Government Techniques on the Dark Web 
Internet freedom advocates have raised concerns about government techniques to unmask the 
identity of dark web users, largely because there are few details on how such technology actually op-
erates, and who has access to it.103   
In Kyllo v. United States, the Court considered whether law enforcement’s use of technology not 
generally available to the public constitutes a search, thereby triggering the Fourth Amendment prob-
able cause requirement.104  The Court held that the government’s use of sense-enhancing technology 
“not in general public use,” aimed at the interior of a home, is a physical intrusion of a constitutionally 
protected area and therefore a search.105 
While the search in Kyllo involved activity directed into a home, where individuals have a strong 
expectation of privacy, activity on the dark web is distinguishable in that the Internet is a public space, 
therefore individuals have no legitimate expectation of privacy.  Unlike Kyllo, the government is not 
invading a constitutionally protected area in analyzing patterns of activity or unveiling the identity of 
individuals who are violating the law.  Instead, such activity is being done in the open in a public fo-
rum—the identity of each individual is merely encrypted.  This is akin to an individual, covered with a 
full-bodied mask and a voice converter, committing criminal activity on a public street.  Government 
techniques to unencrypt otherwise public activity would therefore not constitute a “search” under the 
Fourth Amendment.106  
It should be noted that those who use the dark web for perfectly legal reasons, such as journalists, 
activists, and the politically oppressed, are left with diminished privacy due to law enforcement’s 
strong interest in unveiling darknet activity.  The policy herein lies in the harm such anonymity may 
 
102. See United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 752 (1971) (the Supreme Court unambiguously held that an individ-
ual does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in information voluntarily disclosed to a third party, 
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expectation of privacy in his or her IP address, and therefore government acquisition of an IP address on TOR 
through the network investigative technique does not constitute a search under the Fourth Amendment. See 
Farrell, 2016 WL 705197, at 1; Matish, 2016 WL 3545776, at 20-21; Werdene, 2016 WL 3002376, at 1; 
Michaud, 2016 WL 337263, at 7.  
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cause the public in the form of hiding criminals, on balance with the public’s concern for privacy.  
Strong encryption is burdening investigations as more criminals are turning to the dark web.  Alterna-
tively, many argue this is merely an indicator that law enforcement must develop more effective meth-
ods to solve crimes without violating the public’s evolving expectation of privacy.  
C. Modernizing the Third Party Doctrine 
Although the current state of the law indicates there may never be a reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy on the dark web, the scope of the third party doctrine should nonetheless be reevaluated to con-
form to the modern reality of Internet usage today.  The benefits of sharing information on an anony-
mous platform such as TOR are plenty.  Privacy furthers democracy, knowledge, and human rights, 
and should not be left entirely unprotected by outdated law. 
The third party doctrine was developed in an era that did not contemplate the complexity of the 
Internet nor how widely used the Internet would eventually become.  If left intact as technology con-
tinues to develop, the third party doctrine leaves little room for activity that our society would now 
consider objectively reasonable, and forecasts a bleak future where individuals cannot expect privacy 
in the most sacred dealings of life given the impracticability of participating in modern society without 
utilizing third party services in some respect. 
The Supreme Court has taken note of this concern.  In 2012, Justice Sotomayor evaluated the short-
comings of the third party doctrine with relation to technological advances:  
Awareness that the Government may be watching chills associational and expressive freedoms.  
And the Government’s unrestrained power to assemble data that reveal private aspects of iden-
tity is susceptible to abuse. . . .  [I]t may be necessary to reconsider the premise that an individual 
has no reasonable expectation of privacy in information voluntarily disclosed to third parties.107  
Justice Alito has likewise taken issue with the law in the face of technological advancements.  “The 
Katz expectation of privacy test . . . is not without its own difficulties.  It involves a degree of circularity, 
[citation], and judges are apt to confuse their own expectations of privacy with those of the hypothet-
ical reasonable person to which the Katz test looks.”108  Justice Alito further recognized that, “[t]ech-
nology can change those expectations.”109   
These observations certainly lay some foundation for evolving the law; however, privacy on the 
dark web will likely remain unaffected by any privacy advancements given its public nature and pro-
pensity to harbor criminal activity. 
VI. JURISDICTIONAL CONSTRAINTS TO COMBATING INTERNATIONAL CRIME 
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Today, cross-border data transfers are inevitable, and conflicting privacy laws across jurisdictions 
further the likelihood that one country will violate the privacy expectations of citizens in another cul-
ture.  While the United States takes a particular stance on encryption, privacy, and the dark web, other 
jurisdictions may disagree with the limits law enforcement may go to unencrypt communications.  Dig-
ital evidence is complex—it is “not only often stored outside a jurisdiction that might seek it, but highly 
mobile and split between several locations.  It may be owned or operated from still others.”110  While 
a challenge, governments have managed to resolve jurisdictional questions with regard to other intan-
gible goods, such as intellectual property.111  
A. International Cooperation 
One trend to overcoming jurisdictional obstacles is to engage in closer cooperation with foreign 
law enforcement agencies.112  Some of the most famous cybercrime busts have occurred through in-
ternational cooperation, such as the takedown of Shiny Flakes in Germany,113 and Operation Onymous, 
where collaboration between Europol, the FBI, and the U.S. Department of Homeland Security led to 
the arrest of seventeen people across several countries in connection with various black market crime 
rings.114 The international community has been taking collaboration and differing privacy standards 
seriously.  In 2007, the OECD adopted the Recommendation on Cross-Border Co-Operation in the En-
forcement of Laws Protecting Privacy to address privacy on a global scale.115  In response, the U.S. 
Federal Trade Commission (FTC), together with enforcement authorities from around the world, 
founded the Global Privacy Enforcement Network to promote cross-border information sharing, in-
vestigation, and enforcement cooperation.116  Most recently, INTERPOL and Europol have proposed 
establishing a Joint Cybercrime Cooperation and Compatibility Taskforce to help harmonize differing 
legal systems and create an efficient method for cooperation.117 
One tool that has facilitated international cooperation is “mutual legal assistance,” where one coun-
try may request the government of another country to get a local judge to issue a warrant for the in-
formation at issue.  Mutual Legal Assistance (MLA), regarded as a solution to obtaining data held in-
ternationally, is an agreement, or often a treaty, between countries to provide assistance to one 
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another regarding criminal legal matters.118  This process is determined by a combination of national 
law, and treaties on international crime.119  “MLA is resilient because it is the only process that ties 
together the laws of both receiving and requesting country, making it legally robust at all stages.”120  
MLA was instrumental in the case of the Silk Road, where authorities in Iceland assisted U.S. authori-
ties and facilitated the capture of Ross Ulbricht in San Francisco.121 
While MLA facilitates lawful collaboration, it also has its drawbacks.  For instance, conflicts arise 
where one country prohibits disclosure of data, but the laws of another country compel its disclo-
sure.122  Further, it is often unclear how, with whom, and when data can be shared from jurisdiction to 
jurisdiction.  Administrative inefficiencies pose another problem to MLA—the time it takes to process 
an MLA can render the mechanism practically moot.  The procedure is long, requiring an administra-
tive legal process, and duplicate checking of paperwork in each country.123  For example in the U.K., it 
can take up to thirteen months to process an MLA request, and in the U.S., it can take up to ten 
months.124  Because expediency is often critical to coordinate a meaningful response, such inefficien-
cies undercut the efficacy of MLA.   
The reality of inconsistent approaches to privacy rights across jurisdictions emphasizes the need 
for a more fluid system of international cooperation.  One solution is to streamline the MLA process by 
removing the red tape, where possible.125  Another is to create a global clearinghouse to handle MLA 
requests according to a uniform body of rules.126  Although this task would take many years to put in 
place, with no promise of success, such a coalition, if formed with the right partners, could entice others 
to join in due time.127  
B. Choice of Law 
In addition to, and as a part of MLA, courts must also determine which laws apply to data flowing 
across multiple jurisdictions, further complicating the issue.  The international community has devel-
oped a deep distrust in U.S. intelligence practices as a consequence of the Snowden leaks, thereby mak-
ing collaboration more difficult.128    
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On the surface web, a heated battle is already being fought over whether U.S. law enforcement, with 
a valid search warrant, can require information owned by an American firm, stored in an off-shore 
data center, be turned over to facilitate a criminal investigation.129  Since 2013, Microsoft has refused 
to turn over data stored oversees in Dublin, Ireland to the U.S. government, claiming that the foreign 
physical location of the data storage center means it is not subject to U.S. law, and that the U.S. govern-
ment must obtain the information through collaborating with foreign authorities rather than compel-
ling Microsoft to violate its users’ expectations of privacy.130  The U.S. government maintains that be-
cause Microsoft is a U.S. company, it is bound by U.S. laws and therefore must comply with the 
warrant.131  The lower court sided with the government and held Microsoft in contempt for its failure 
to comply with the warrant.132  On appeal, the Second Circuit reversed the district court, holding that 
“Congress did not intend the SCA’s warrant provisions to apply extraterritorially” and that “the SCA 
does not authorize a U.S. court to issue and enforce an SCA warrant against a United States-based ser-
vice provider for the contents of a customer’s electronic communications stored on servers located 
outside the United States.133  In interpreting Congressional intent, the court reasoned that the Stored 
Communications Act “[n]either explicitly nor implicitly . . . envision[ed] the application of its warrant 
provisions overseas,” given that the statute was drafted at a time where data transfers across interna-
tional boundaries were not routine as they are today.134  The court further noted that the decision 
“serves the interests of comity that, as the MLAT process reflects, ordinarily govern the conduct of 
cross-boundary criminal investigations.”135  As a consequence of the Microsoft litigation, there is now 
a developing trend among technology companies to physically store data in countries beyond U.S. con-
trol to eliminate backdoor access by the U.S. government.136   
World governments are carefully tracking the Microsoft decision, as an outcome in favor of the U.S. 
will threaten the sovereignty of other nations without delivering a similar benefit.137  In addition to 
threatening the sovereignty of other governments, an outcome in favor of the U.S. will also affect the 
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reputation of technology companies before their consumers.  If law enforcement can compel U.S. com-
panies to disclose data physically stored abroad, businesses with international clients may further 
erode—a setback many companies are fearful of in light of the damage caused by the Snowden leaks 
and the National Security Agency’s program PRISM.138  Driven by consumer privacy demands, tech-
nology companies are increasingly reconfiguring their services to strengthen security to protect 
against data breaches and government-compelled information requests.139  As a result, the FBI, now 
hindered by an inability to access data even with a valid warrant, has devoted an entire unit to fighting 
the war on encryption.140  
C. Public Policy 
While international cooperation and legal formalities are the ideal method preferred by data sub-
jects and the international community alike, countries have regularly bypassed collaboration by ob-
taining evidence unilaterally through less formal methods.  The drawbacks of this approach include 
less accountability and less transparency, which can encourage governments to work around the law 
without being subjected to public accountability. 
As a policy matter, it is critical to accept the reality that while governments will always act in self-
interest to preserve national interests, a country’s citizens are also foreigners of other nations.  Under-
handed behavior at the expense of international relations and diplomacy will encourage other sover-
eigns to reciprocate and infringe on the privacy rights of the U.S. and its citizens.141  It is within the 
interests of the U.S. to respect the varying privacy standards from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, and pur-
sue lawful, cooperative means to facilitate criminal investigations.142  In the end, combating crime on 
the dark web is an international objective, shared by all nations.  Recognition that privacy is a funda-
mental human right of all people, irrespective of citizenship, will strengthen rapport between sover-
eigns and among consumers, and will result in more effective cooperation, better intelligence, and 
more security for all in the long run.143  
VII. CONCLUSION 
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Privacy on the Internet is difficult to define, as the purpose of the Internet was to create a network 
to facilitate the sharing of information.  As we move toward a world where the most intimate details 
of our lives are now recorded and stored online for an indefinite duration, and further toward a world 
where the public is fighting to modernize the concept of Internet privacy under the law, the current 
U.S. framework must be reevaluated as our society continues to evolve and innovate.  In the end, it is 
in the best interests of both individuals and the U.S. to maintain a system whereby the government, 
with probable cause and a valid warrant issued from a neutral magistrate, retains a lawful avenue to 
access encrypted data to facilitate criminal investigations and gather effective, relevant intelligence.  
Likewise, to gain allies in the fight against dark web crime, the U.S. government should continue to 
employ collaborative efforts to facilitate extraterritorial investigations within the legal framework of 
the particular sovereign housing the data at issue.  The fate of our privacy, as a fundamental human 
right, will depend largely on the policy debates surrounding the extent to which we, as a nation, and 
as a world, value privacy on balance with security.  
 
